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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MAX E. BIRCH and FONTELLA
BIRCH, his wife,

)

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

1

FORREST W. FULLER and JUDITH HYDE
FULLER, his wife, KENNETH W. JUDD
and RUBY F. JUDD, his wife,

Case

~No. 8822

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants, in their brief, omit most of the pertinent
facts of the case, and for this reason, the Respondents
object to the Appellants' facts and make the following
statement of facts:
In the fall of 1956 the Defendant Appellant, Forrest W.
Fuller, was employed by the Plaintiff Respondents to sell
real property owned by them in Duchesne County. In the
spring of 1957 the said real property was to be sold for
taxes unless the back taxes were paid, and inasmuch as the
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Appellant Fuller had not found a buyer for the property,
he agreed to attempt to borrow money on the property for
the Respondents, and in order to borrow the money he
advised Respondents that if they would sign a Real Estate
Contract on the property with someone with a good credit
rating, he would be able to borrow a couple of thousand

'.(,!

dollars for them in order to pay off the taxes and save the
property from being sold. The Respondents were dubious
of this matter but upon being assured by the Appellant
Fuller, who was representing them as their attorney at this
time, that all was legal and that there would be no complications, the Respoadents signed a Real Estate Contract
to sell the property to one Robert R. Sather, the Defendant,
which is shown as Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A". This contract
was never to have been a binding contract, but oniy for
the purpose of borrowing money for the Respondents to
pay taxes and other outstanding bills. On or about March
31, 1957, the Def::~ndant Sather and the Respondents executer a mortgage in favor of Security Loan and Finance
Corporation at Duchesne, Utah, and turned the same over
to the Appellant Fuller to borrow the funds, and at the
same time, authorized the Appellant Fuller to receive the
$2,000.00 for the Respondents with directions that he was
to pay certain obligations then outstanding against the
Respondents as their attorney. At the time of executing
said mortgage, the Appellant Fuller gave the Respondents
his personal check in the sum of $891.87 to pay the taxes
on the property before the same became delinquent, which
sum was to have been deducted from the $2,000.00 which

2.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Appellant was to receive on the loan. The check of
the Appellant Fuller was given to the Duchesne County
Treasurer the following day to pay the taxes. However,
the check was returned about April 5th with the notation
that there were not sufficient funds to pay the same. On
or about April lOth, the Respondent Max Birch called to
the office of the Appellant Fuller and advised him that the
check had not been paid and the Appellant Fuller gave him
a new check with an additional $2.50 as protest fees to
cover the check that had been returned and advised the
Respondent that there were sufficient funds in the bank to
cover the check at this time; that the Respondent Max
Birch called the Continental Bank and was advised that
no funds were available to pay the check at that time. The
Appellant Fuller was to have paid payments to Wheeler
Machinery Company of Salt Lake and to J Harold Call
of Heber, Utah, on judgments rendered against the Respondents; that checks were made by Fuller to pay these
two accounts but were returned marked "Insufficient
Funds" and a check was also given to Respondent for the
sum of $50.00 which was marked "Insufficient Funds" when
presented for payment and which check was not paid until
after the Respondent signed a complaint for issuing a check
against insufficient funds. The checks to J Harold Call
and Wheeler Machinery were finally made good approximately thirty to sixty days after the mortgage was signed.
There is still $50.00 outstanding which the Appellant Fuller
charged as title option fee for handling the transaction for
the Respondents.
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On or about April 20, 1957, the Respondents rented
the oil rights in said land to the Standard Oil Company of
California and the Appellant Fuller was informed of this
lease by the agent of Standard Oil Company and the
Appellant Fuller immediately then made a payment of
$290.00 on the mortgage to the Security Loan and Finance
Corporation and sent the Uniform Real Estate Contract of
January 31, 1957, to the Defendant Robert R. Sather to be
notarized and recorded, which was done.
A:t a later date, Respondent Max E. Birch and Defendant Sather entered into an option agreement for the same
land as described in the prlor Uniform Real Estate Contract
except thart Respondents' home was not to be included,
and within a day or two thereafter, Defendant Sather executed a release of the Uniform Real Estate Contract,
(Plaintiff's Exhibit "B").
Subsequent to the execution of the Sather-Birch option,
the Appellents Kenneth W. Judd and Forrest Fuller as
partners (transcript, Judd D-62-16) personally and by and
through their agents, entered upon the property of Respondents, tore down buildings and corrals located thereon and
erected new corrals and fences and took over farming of
said premises, the Respondents retaining possession of their
home.
The Appellants, personally and by and through their
agents, continued farming the premises and doing other
work thereon until the early part of July, 1957, when a
dispute arose among the Respondents and the Appellants
4.
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as to the use of the ground, inasmuch as the option had not
been exercised by Sather, and as a result of said dispute, a
notice of Lis Pendens was filed in the County Recorder's
office on July 9, 1957, by the Appellants, and the following
day, the Defendant F. A. Hatch served a notice to vacate
upon the Respondents, which notice claimed that the Appellants Forrest W. Fuller, Judith Hyde Fuller, Kenneth W.
Judd and Ruby F. Judd were owners of the property and
that unless the Respondents paid to the Appellants the sum
of $510.00 within five days, they would be evicted (transcript Birch D-43-8, 9 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit G) .
The Appellants never filed an action as alleged in their
Lis Pendens and so on or about July 29, 1957, the Respondents filed a complaint naming Appellants as Defendants and
asking damages for slander of title and unauthorized trespass.
That the Appellants and Defendants continued farming
and in possesion of said premises during the month of
August to the detriment of the Respondents, and therefore,
it became necessary for an order to show cause and temporary restraining order to issue, which was done on the
13th day of August, 1957, which rna tter was heard on the
17th day of August, 1957, before the Honorable Maurice
Harding at the Courthouse in Duchesne County without a
reporter, at which time the several Appellants and Defendants and Respondents testified as to the facts set out hereinabove and the Court ordered that a bond in the sum of
$375.00 be posted by the Appellants before allowing their
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livestock to feed any further on the premises of the Respondents and before they continued to harvest any of the
crops thereon; that said bond was subsequently filed and
the Appellants allowed their livestock to graze upon the
Respondents' ground and harvested the crops thereon.
That after several delays at the request of the Appellants, the matter finally came to trial on November 25, 1957,
at 11:15 o'clock A. M., in the County Courthouse at Duchesene, Utah, at which time a stipulation was entered
into by the attorneys for the parties to the effect that the
Court, having previously heard the testimony as to the
above facts upon the order to show cause and having discussed the same in pre-trial, agreed that the trial would
:~:::

proceed from the standpoint of damages for the entry of

:"Ri:~

any Defendants onto the land and any damages that may
have been sustained because of slander of title (Birch,
D-5-23).
During the trial, several witnesses for the Plaintiff
Respondents were called and testified as to the damages
sustained by the Respondents.

Upon stipulation of the

parties, the Court and counsel recessed to view the premises
at which time the Court was shown the actual damages
sustained by the Respondents. Upon the Court's convening,
it was stipulated that the Appellants had filed a Lis Pendens

upon the property and that no suit had been filed by the
Defendants, Forrest W. Fuller and Judith Hyde Fuller and
Kenneth W. Judd and Ruby F. Judd upon which a Lis
Pendens could be based. (transcript, page 77).
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That in order to save time and so that the matter
would not have to be continued to some later date, the
parties stipulated to the Court as to the testimony they
would offer if their witnesses were caUed, and after said
stipulations were read into record, the Court considered
all the testimony offered, the stipulations as made, the
Exhibits as offered and all the facts presented, and the
Court found that the Lis Pendens had been filed without
just cause and with malice and entered judgement against
the Defendants, Forrest W. Ful'ler and Judith Hyde Fuller,
his wife, and Kenneth W. Judd and Ruby F. Judd, his wife
in the amount of $128.00 actual damages and $500.00 attorney's fee from slander of title and $877.00 less $435.00
set off for trespass.
ARGUMENT

Answer to Point 1: Appellants, in their argument,
attempt to show that there was no bad faith in filing the
Lis Pendens, and therefore, no basis for damages. However,
the facts of this case clearly show that there could be no
other basis for filing the Lis Pendens other than malice on
the part of the Appellants.
"While malice is not necessarily presumed from
the falsity of the statement of the defendant,
it may in certain cases be inferred therefrom,
or from other facts or circumstances, as where
the attendant circumstances convincingly point
to the inference that the party charged with the
slander of title was not in good faith endeavoring
to uphold or assert a supposedly valid claim of
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title in himself."
319, Section 359.

33 American Jurisprudence,

"It was not incumbent upon plaintiff to establish malice by direct evidence. It is sufficient
if a reasonable inference of malice may be drawn
from the evidence. Of course, if the defendant
at the time of making such statement knew it had
no lease or had no probable cause for believing
it had one, it acted maliCiously. Where different
reasonable inferences can be drawn from the
evidence on such issue, the question is for the
jury to decide. In this connection, we ask, why
did the defendant remove its advertising signs
from the premises if it honestly believed it had
a lease? We think the good faith of the defendant
is challenged by the evidence." Cawrse v. Signal
Oil Company, 103 P. (2d) 729.
"As we have shown above plaintiff had pleaded that the claim set forth in the instrument
recorded by defendant was false. That was sufficient averment of falsity. The instrument claimed that the land apparently owned by plaintiff in
reality belonged to defendant because it had been
purchased by plaintiff as agent for defendant.
This claim was false. It is not necessary, as
argued by defendant, that all the words be false,
it is sufficient if the statement which disparages
the plaintiff's interest in his property is fa'lse."
Dowse v. Doris Trust Company (Supreme Court
of Utah) 208 P. (2d) 956, 958.
The Appellants never claimed any right or interest in
Respondents' premises by filing a counter-claim to Respondents's complaint, but just filed an answer admitting possession. Further, the Appellants never objected to the Court's
8.
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quieting title in the Respondents (Paragraph 4 of Judgment)
which further shows that they had no interest in the property and no basis for filing the Lis Pendens.
Such fact of malice or lack of just cause was amply
found by the Court, which finding will not be disturbed.
"Therefore, in accord with the holdings of this
court, that the judgment of the trial court will
not be disturbed, unless the evidence clearly preponderates against its findings; or there has been
a plain abuse of discretion, or where manifest injustice or inequity is present, we affirm the
court's ruling * * *" Beezley v Beezley, 296 P.
(2d) 274, 277. (Utah Supreme Court, 1956).
Answer to Point 2: The Appellants, Judith Hyde Fuller,
Ruby F. Judd and Forrest W. Fuller, attempt to claim that
there is no evidence introduced to show that they had ever
entered upon the land of the Respondents, whereas paragraph 2 of their answer to the Plaintiffs' complint, which
was filed in this matter on August 20, 1957, fully admits
this as follows:
"2' Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in Plaintiff's SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION except that they admit they are in possession persuant (sic) to an agreement made by
the Plaintiffs to sell the property which the Defendants are occupying to the defendants Forrest
W. Fuller and Kenneth W. Judd."
Inasmuch as the Defendants by their answer had admitted possession of the premises and as a result of the
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discussion at pre-trial wherein the Defendants fully admitted possession, the Court decided to hear only testimony
concerning the measure of damages that the Respondents
had suffered. (Birch, D-4-27, 28, and Birch D-5-23, 24 and
25).

;: :~

All pre-trial discussions on this matter showed that
the Appellants, Forrest W. Fuller and Judith Hyde Fuller,
his wife, and Kenneth W. Judd and Ruby F. Judd, his wife,
were partners in operating and farming the Birch premises.
This is clearly shown by the letter from Appellant Fuller
to the Respondents, Plaintiff's Exhibit "F", and by the
testimony of Appellant Judd to the effect that he and
Fuller were partners. (transcript, Judd D-62-16).

,~ :::

The Respondents allowed the Appellants to come onto
the premises and farm the same because of the option they
had entered into with Defendant Sather, (transcript, Birch
D-9-1, 2) whereas the Appellants went into possession of the
property under guise of the said Uniform Real Estate
Contract or under some other guise and without any right,
title or authority whatsoever, (transcript Judd D-61-1-22).
CONCLUSION

The facts in this case show a brazen attempt on the
part of the Appellants to occupy and farm the property of
the Respondents without any right, ti·tle or authority whatsoever, or at the most, under the guise of a fraudulent real
estate contract without any intention whatsoever to pay for
the feed and crops removed therefrom, and further, that
10.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Lis Pendens was filed against this property solely for the
purpose of maliciously causing the Respondents great
trouble and expense and to prevent them from freely disposing of their property. Further, the Appellants by admitting in their answer that they had possession of the
property and were occupying the same and by their failure
to file a counter-claim alleging title or right to the property
and not objecting to the findings and decree quieting title
in the Respondents are now estopped to deny that said Lis
Pendens was filed without just cause and that they "ever
entered upon the land of the Respondents."
The Court's denying Appellantss' motion to dismiss and
granting judgment a~ainst the Defendants was therefore
proper under the facts and circumstances of this case.

RESPEcrFULLY SUBMITTED:

/

/

/,1/t{Mi(~
(

George B. Stanley and
'
Richard L. Maxf~d
Attorneys for Plaintiff Respondents
54 North Main
Heber, Utah
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